CJAA Members,
The FAA has released a new draft of Order 8130.2M (Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft) for public comment. This internal guidance document directs FAA personnel on enforcing regulations for experimental and special category aircraft. Comments are due by June 9, 2026.
Two major proposed changes would severely restrict operations of classic and experimental jets:
1. Unwarranted “High-Risk” Classification and Associated Restrictions
The draft proposes to properly mitigate risk by issuing the D-4(f) limitations in Table D-1 for certain aircraft, including:
“(2) Aircraft whose minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation below 10,000’ MSL is greater than 250 kts;”
It further states that aircraft meeting these criteria (along with other high-risk factors) are to be treated as follows:
“Restrict operations of aircraft having any of the very high-risk factors or safety of flight issues described in paragraph D-4.f as follows: (1) Prohibit the carriage of passengers, (1) Prohibit flight over densely populated areas for all phases of flight, (2) Prohibit flight at night, (3) Restrict operations under instrument flight rules (IFR) to visual meteorological conditions (VMC)…”
This “high risk” classification and the resulting broad operating restrictions are not supported by operational data or safety history.
Arguments against each proposed restriction:
- Prohibit the carriage of passengers: Speed has no demonstrated correlation with increased passenger risk in these aircraft. Many experimental jets have safely carried passengers for decades under existing limitations. This blanket prohibition ignores the pilot’s qualifications, the aircraft’s proven airworthiness, and the fact that passenger carriage is already permitted in other experimental aircraft without high-speed classifications. It unnecessarily restricts legitimate personal, training, and ferry operations.
- Prohibit flight over densely populated areas: This has no basis in safety data for high-speed experimental jets. Current operating limitations already require sufficient altitude for safe emergency landings. Maintenance facilities, fuel stops, and many viable routes are located near or over urban areas. Prohibiting such overflights would force inefficient routing, increase fuel consumption, and create more traffic conflicts without improving safety. Experimental aircraft have operated safely in this manner for decades after Phase I testing.
- Prohibit flight at night: Night operations are a standard and safe practice for these jets, which are often equipped with advanced lighting, instrumentation, and redundant systems. Prohibiting night flight would impose severe limitations on cross-country operations, forcing pilots into extended daytime flights with increased fatigue, weather exposure, and rushed decision-making. There is no evidence that experimental jets have higher night accident rates attributable to speed.
- Restrict operations under IFR to VMC only: These jets frequently and safely operate in IMC, particularly above 18,000 feet, where they perform most efficiently and safely. High-altitude IMC flight is routine and necessary for efficient cross-country routing. These aircraft are all equipped and regularly fly in all sorts of IMC conditions. Many, if not most, have been upgraded with the latest IFR equipment. They fall under the same rules as certificated aircraft, and it is in fact safer to operate in IMC than to try to avoid it. Forcing avoidance of clouds would mandate unnecessary deviations around weather systems, increasing exposure to traffic conflicts, controller workload, and fatigue—making operations less safe, not safer. ATC is fully capable of handling these aircraft in all conditions, just as they do with military jets.
Additional supporting points:
- Higher speeds improve safety and maneuverability. Faster aircraft often have superior climb performance, better energy management, and more effective control response.
- Many experimental jets have long operated safely at speeds well above 250 KCAS. Military aircraft routinely exceed this threshold in the National Airspace System, with ATC fully trained to handle them.
- There is no documented history of accidents or incidents attributable to experimental jets operating at these speeds.
These changes ignore decades of safe operation and the design characteristics of these aircraft, which are optimized for higher altitudes and speeds.
Recommended Action for this section: Request the complete deletion of D-4(f)(2) (the “minimum safe airspeed greater than 250 kts” criterion) and the associated high-risk restrictions.
2. Increased Runway Length Requirements
The draft imposes stricter performance standards (quoted directly from the proposal) that exceed current practical limits for many jets:
“Takeoff is prohibited if the accelerate-stop distance exceeds the runway available for takeoff. For aircraft without accelerate-stop distance data, the airplane must be able to safely stop within the available runway after accelerating to the greater of: (a) 105 percent of VMCA; or (b) 115 percent of the power-off stalling speed in the takeoff configuration. The aircraft must be able to clear all obstacles by at least 50 feet vertically, or as required by an applicable published procedure, whichever is higher. Landing is prohibited unless a full stop landing can be made within 60 percent of the available runway length from a height of 50 feet above the runway. When calculating takeoff or landing performance, appropriate corrections (e.g., runway gradient, density altitude, runway surface condition, etc.) must be made. If performance data based on calm wind is used, not more than 50 percent of any reported headwind component and not less than 150 percent of any reported tailwind component may be calculated. Calculations may not include the use of reverse thrust or drag chute.”
Runway overrun incidents are primarily a function of pilot training, decision-making, and judgment—not aircraft performance. Further restricting access to runways will have the opposite of the intended effect: it will reduce operational flexibility, limit access to a wider range of airports, and fail to address the root cause. This issue is not unique to experimental jets.
Several recent US business jet accidents illustrate this reality, including:
- 2017 Teterboro Learjet 35A crash — Unstabilized approach, poor crew decision-making, and failure to go around led to a low-altitude stall and fatal crash.
- 2014 Gulfstream G-IV overrun at Bedford, MA — Rejected takeoff after high-speed decision, with contributing factors including inadequate pre-takeoff planning and crew resource management.
- 2020 Cessna Citation II/SP overrun at Lufkin, TX — Pilot’s decision to land on a wet runway that did not provide sufficient stopping distance.
Imposing more restrictive runway requirements on classic jets will not enhance safety—it will simply reduce options without improving pilot proficiency or training standards.
Recommended Action for this section: Request that no changes be made to the existing runway length/performance guidance.
Call to Action: The FAA requires comments to be submitted using their official Comment Matrix for proper tracking and review.
Visit the official draft orders page: FAA Aircraft Certification Service Draft Orders
- Download the Draft Order 8130.2M and the Comment Matrix (Excel spreadsheet).
- Use the Comment Matrix to structure your remarks clearly by section and paragraph.
- In the Comment Matrix, enter your own name in the “Reviewer / Router Number” field.
- Please modify and personalize the comments to reflect your own experience and perspective so the FAA does not receive multiple identical submissions.
- Email your completed comments (and the matrix) to: [email protected] by June 9, 2026.
Please reference the specific sections in the draft Order 8130.2M (particularly paragraphs D-4.f and D-4.g, and Table D-1). If you need talking points or assistance drafting comments, contact CJAA leadership.
Your detailed input is critical to preserving safe and practical operations for our aircraft.
